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Abstract
This paper studies a two-stage dual-channel supply 
chain consisting of one manufacturer and one traditional 
retailer. The manufacturer has its own online channel 
when he sells the product to the offline retailer. There 
exists a Stackelberg game between the manufacturer 
and the offline retailer, in which the manufacturer is the 
leader and the retailer is the follower. The manufacturer 
abandons the pricing right in the online channel and 
adopts the marketing strategy which the online retail 
price is equal to the offline one. When the supply chain 
is in a static (undisrupted) condition, it can obtain 
Pareto improvement and eventually be coordinated 
by a two-part-tariff contract with a one-time transfer 
payment. When disruptions make the manufacturer’s 
unit production cost change, we can obtain the retail 
price, the production quantity and the total supply 
chain profit under different disruption levels in the 
centralized supply chain. Then, we find that there are 
some certain robustness both in the manufacturer’s 
production quantity and in the offline retail price. When 
the supply chain is decentralized, we can coordinate the 
supply chain by changing the wholesale price according 
to different disruption levels. Finally, some numerical 
examples are presented to illustrate the results.
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INTRODUCTION
Large retail companies setting online channels, such 
as SuNing in China, are committed to promoting the 
“Online2Offline” mode, which is the new marketing 
mode and sets the same retail price in online and offline 
channels. Many large retail giants besides SuNing 
have also started building e-stores dedicated to attract 
consumers which set the same online and offline price. 
On the other hand, electric retail giant such as Tmall also 
begins to build offline experience shop. Although price 
mechanism is faced with some problems in practice, it has 
become a trend to coordinate dual-channel supply chain 
with the development of electronic commerce.
With the development of society and economy, 
E-commerce has become an important mode for 
manufacturers to do their business. Self-built electronic 
channel and traditional channel form dual-channel supply 
chain under E-commerce. Several studies have examined 
dual-channel supply chains. Rhee and Park (2000) study 
a hybrid channel design problem, assuming that price 
sensitive segment and service sensitive segment are two 
consumer segments. Chiang et al. (2003) examine a 
price-competition game in a dual-channel supply chain, 
the supply chain can be coordinated by some supply 
chain contracts such as the wholesale price contract, the 
buyback contract, the revenue-sharing contract, the two-
part-tariff strategy and other supply chain contracts. Ryan 
et al. (2013) consider a dual-channel supply chain in 
which a manufacturer sells a single product to end-users 
through both an offline retail channel and a manufacturer-
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owned direct online channel，and proposes an improved 
revenue-sharing contract and gain/loss sharing contract to 
coordinate the supply chain.
Disruptions have a deep effect on the operation of 
supply chain. Natural disasters such as earthquakes, 
tsunamis and landslides, public health emergencies 
which include SARS, H7N9, and man-made emergencies 
such as terrorist attacks affect the operation of the stable 
supply chain. To cope with the supply chain’s disruptions 
has become a very valuable issue for companies around 
the world. Qi et al. (2004) first introduce the idea of 
disruption management in supply chain management. In 
their paper, they consider deviation costs. If the demand 
exceeds the original production quantity, underage cost 
can happen. Based on disruptive management, many 
researchers have extended their studies in various 
scenarios in the supply chain. Huang et al. (2006) 
investigate how to coordinate a dyadic supply chain 
when the retailer faces an exponential demand function. 
The major differences in those studies lie in that the 
market demand functions used are different. Xu (2006) 
studies a kind of supply chain coordination problem 
when the production cost function is a convex one. Lei 
(2012) uses a linear contract to handle supply chain 
coordination in asymmetric information when demand 
and cost disruptions happen. As to the researches of 
multi-retailer supply chain, Xiao et al. (2005, 2007, 
2008) study how to coordinate a supply chain with one 
manufacturer and two competing retailers when demands 
and costs are disrupted. Huang et al. (2012) consider the 
disruption management in a dual-channel supply chain 
under demand disruptions. Huang et al. (2013) also 
study a pricing and production problem in a dual-channel 
supply chain when production costs are disrupted in the 
centralized and decentralized dual-channel supply chain. 
These related studies generally consider the difference 
between centralized and decentralized decision-making. 
There are few researchers in the field that examine a 
particular contract under the coordination of disruption 
management in dual-channel supply chain. The same 
situation is true for studies in exploring equal-price 
marketing model in dual-channel supply chain. In this 
paper, we examine the price mechanism in the marketing 
model, the feasibility of coordinating a dual-channel 
supply chain with two-part-tariff contract, the decision in 
dual-channel supply chain when cost disruption occurs, 
and the mechanism design to coordinate the supply chain 
with two-part-tariff contract. Finally, some numerical 
examples are shown to illustrate the related results.
1.  BASIC MODEL
There exist one manufacturer and one offline retailer 
in a two-stage supply chain. The manufacturer orders 
its product from both offline channel and online retail 
channel. The retail price is the same both in the online 
channel and offline channel.
1.1  Notation
The notation used for the model is shown in Table 1.
Table1
Notation and Parameters for the Problems
Value Description Test values
a Total market demand 2000
θ Demand proportion of online channel 0.4
b1 Price coefficient in the online channel 10
b1 Price coefficient in the offline channel 20
p Unit sale price in O2O channel Decision variable
cm Unit manufacturing cost 10
cr Unit offline channel sales cost 6
cd Unit online channel sales cost 4
Δcm Unit production cost disruption 12,8,4,0,-2,-6,-10
k1
Marginal costs when production plan 
increases 5
k2
Marginal costs when production plan 
decreases 5
p Unit sale price in O2O channel after disruption Decision variable
w The wholesale price of offline channel Decision variable
1.2  The Basic Model
We build a demand function considering both online 
channel and offline channel：
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equation:
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respectively.
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2.  COORDINATION OF SUPPLY CHAIN 
UNDER A STABLE STATE
In the dual-channel compensation mechanism, the 
manufacturer is the leader of this game and can decide the 
wholesale price and transfer payment. The offline retailer 
decides to order product quantity and set the sale price in 
the supply chain. Based on the Stackelberg game theory, 
the retailer’s profit function can be written as.
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The response function of the optimal retail price is
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the wholesale price is
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the retail price is
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the profit of the retailer is
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and the profit of the manufacturer is
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respectively.
The total profit of the supply chain is  * * *( )d rπ πΠ = + = Π .
Lemma 1. If a dual-channel supply chain faces a 
demand function shown in Equation (1), the participants’ 
profits in the equal-price supply chain can achieve Pareto 
improvement and the total profit of the supply chain can 
be maximized by the two-part-tariff pricing contract (w,T):
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Proof.
In the independent decision-making state without 
contracts, the profit function of the offline retailer is
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The optimal price response function is 
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The manufacturer’s profit function is
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The optimal wholesale price is
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Therefore, the retailer’s profit in the dual-channel 
supply chain is
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The difference of the retailer’s profit between π*r and 
π0r is
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The profit of the manufacturer is
.
The difference of the manufacturer’s profit between π*d 
and π0d is
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In order to achieve Pareto improvement, the profits of 
the manufacturer and the retailer should satisfy
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Therefore, the range of the one-time transfer payment 
is 
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3.  CENTRALIZED DECISION AFTER 
COST DISRUPTION
Centralized decision-making in the supply chain is 
to study the overall optimal supply chain pricing and 
production plan in an integrated way. Then, some 
unexpected events occur, which leads to some changes in 
the manufacturer’s production cost after the manufacturer 
arranges production plan according to market forecast in 
stable state. In the disruption model, the demand functions 
of the supply chain are
  
 
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
11
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As the result of the disruption, the manufacturer needs 
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   * *
1 21 2 qq q q+ < +
, 
and needs to reduce the production quantity when 
   * *
1 21 2 qq qq >+ +
   * *
1 21 2 qq q q+ < + . We assume that there is a central 
decision-maker who seeks to maximize the total supply 
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expression for the supply chain profit function is derived 
from the following equations
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In Equation (5), the third term on the right side of 
the equation is the cost associated with the increase 
of production quantity and the fourth term is the cost 
associated with the decrease of production quantity.
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There are two cases in the supply chain, which are 
shown as follows:
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 * * 1 2 1 2
2
1 2
( )
2( )
m d ra b b c b c b cp p
b b
+ + + +
= =
+
 


* * 1 1 2 1 2
112
1 2
* * 2 1 2 1 2
222
1 2
( )
2( )
( )(1 )
2(
]
]
)
[
[
m d r
m d r
b a b b c b c b cq q a
b b
b a b b c b c b cq q a
b b
θ
θ
+ + + +
= = −
+
+ + + +
= = − −
+





, and
 * * 1 2 1 2
2
1 2
( )
2( )
m d ra b b c b c b cp p
b b
+ + + +
= =
+
 


* * 1 1 2 1 2
112
1 2
* * 2 1 2 1 2
222
1 2
( )
2( )
( )(1 )
2(
]
]
)
[
[
m d r
m d r
b a b b c b c b cq q a
b b
b a b b c b c b cq q a
b b
θ
θ
+ + + +
= = −
+
+ + + +
= = − −
+





.
When the disruption suddenly happens and makes the 
unit production cost decrease, i.e., Δcm<0, we obtain that 
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Case 4: Δcm≥k2
Similar to case 1, we get
 * 1 2 2
4
1 22( ) 2
d r m ma b c b c c c kp
b b
+ + + ∆ −
= +
+
 


* 1 2 1 2 1 2
14
1 2
* 2 2 1 2 1 2
24
1 2
( )( )
2( )
( )( )(1 )
2
[ ]
[ ]
( )
m m d r
m m d r
b a c c k b b b c b cq a
b b
b a c c k b b b c b cq a
b b
θ
θ
+ + ∆ − + + +
= −
+
+ + ∆ − + + +



= − −
+

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, and
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4
1 22( ) 2
d r m ma b c b c c c kp
b b
+ + + ∆ −
= +
+
 


* 1 2 1 2 1 2
14
1 2
* 2 2 1 2 1 2
24
1 2
( )( )
2( )
( )( )(1 )
2
[ ]
[ ]
( )
m m d r
m m d r
b a c c k b b b c b cq a
b b
b a c c k b b b c b cq a
b b
θ
θ
+ + ∆ − + + +
= −
+
+ + ∆ − + + +



= − −
+


.
Theorem 1. Suppose that a dual-channel supply chain 
faces a demand function shown in Equation (1) and the 
revenue function under the cost disruption is shown in 
Equation (5). When the production cost disruption occurs, 
the optimal retail price is
 * 1
1
* *
1 2
* 2
2
,
2
,
,
2
m
m
m
m
m
c kp if c k
p p if k c k
c kp if c k
∆ + + ∆ ≤ −

= − < ∆ <
 ∆ − + ∆ ≥

~
,
the optimal online sales quantity is
 

* 1
1 1 1
* *
1 1 21
* 2
1 1 2
,
2
,
(
,)
2
)
(
m
m
m
m
m
c kq b if c k
q q if k c k
c kq b if c k
∆ + − ∆ ≤ −

= − < ∆ <
 ∆ − − ∆ ≥

,
the optimal offline sales quantity is
 

* 1
2 2 1
* *
2 1 22
* 2
2 2 2
,
2
,
(
,)
2
)
(
m
m
m
m
m
c kq b if c k
q q if k c k
c kq b if c k
∆ + − ∆ ≤ −

= − < ∆ <
 ∆ − − ∆ ≥

,
and the total optimal profit in the supply chain is
 * * * 21
1 2 1 2 1
* * * *
1 2 1 2
* * * 22
1 2 1 2 2
( )( ) ,
2
,
( )
( )
( ) ( )( ) ,
2
m
m m
m m
m
m m
c kc q q b b if c k
c q q if k c k
c kc q q b b if c k
∆ +Π −∆ + + + ∆ ≤ −

∏ = Π −∆ + − < ∆ <
 ∆ − Π −∆ + + + ∆ ≥

~
.
It can be seen in theorem 1, If unexpected events 
make the unit production cost decrease in the dual 
channel supply chain, the retail price will increase. If 
unexpected events make the unit production cost increase 
in the supply chain, the retail price will decrease. If the 
disruption makes the production cost reduction greatly, 
i.e., Δcm≤-k1, manufacturer will increase corresponding 
production plan, reduce the sales price and increase 
the online sales quantity, which ,in turn, will make the 
offline sales quantity increase. If the disruption makes 
the production cost increase greatly, i.e.,Δcm≥k2,the 
manufacturer will reduce corresponding production 
plan, increase the sales price and decrease the online 
sales quantity, which, in turn, will make the offline sales 
quantity decrease. If the deviation of the production cost 
is relatively small, i.e.,-k1<Δcm<k2, the manufacturer does 
not need to adjust production plan and the sales price. 
Finally, we would like to know the incremental 
improvement in the supply chain performance under 
which there exists production cost disruption. To quantify 
the performance, we compare our results with the scenario 
in the decentralized dual-channel supply chain under the-
same-retail-price mechanism.
4.  DECENTRALIZED DECISION AFTER 
COST DISRUPTION
In the dual-channel supply chain, double marginal 
phenomenon happens when supply chain partners  only 
consider their own optimal decisions. The definition of 
coordination in dual-channel supply chain is that the total 
profit of a dual-channel supply chain in decentralized 
decision equals to that in centralized decision. That is to 
say, for a Stackelberg game, if decentralized decision in 
a dual-channel supply chain is made according to equal-
price mechanism and the coordination mechanism in 
decentralized decision makes the retail price that the 
retailer sets, i.e.,  *WPp
 *p
 WPT
 
2( )[(1 ) ]r p w a b p Tπ θ= − − − −
 2
2
(1 )
2
a wbp
b
θ− +
=
~
~ ~~~
~
~
~
~
, equal to the optimal retail price 
in centralized decision, i.e., 
 *WPp
 *p
 WPT
 
2( )[(1 ) ]r p w a b p Tπ θ= − − −
 2
2
(1 )
2
a wbp
b
θ− +
=
~
~ ~~~
~
~
~
~
, then the supply chain 
performance in decentralized decision is the same as 
that in centralized decision. In order to achieve Pareto 
improvement, the manufacturer needs to offer a one-time 
transfer payment 
 *WPp
 *p
 WPT
 
2( )[(1 ) ]r p w a b p Tπ θ= − − − −
 2
2
(1 )
2
a wbp
b
θ− +
=
~
~ ~~~
~
~
~
~ . The method is consistent with that 
used in stable state.
When the production cost disruption occurs, the 
retailer’s profit function is
  
 *WPp
 *p
 WPT
 
2( )[(1 ) ]r p w a b p Tπ θ= − − − −
 2
2
(1 )
2
a wbp
b
θ− +
=
~
~ ~~~
~
~
~
~
. (10)
Thus, the response function of the wholesale price and 
the optimal retail price is
  
 *WPp
 *p
 WPT
 
2( )[(1 ) ]r p w a b p Tπ θ= − − − −
 2
2
(1 )
2
a wbp
b
θ− +
=
~
~ ~~~
~
~
~
~
. (11)
For the case 1(Δcm≤-k1),
 * *
1 1
2
(1 )2 m
aw p c k
b
θ−
= + ∆ + −
~
, and
~
Thus,  * *
1
TP
p p=   
* *
11 1
TP
q q=   
* *
21 2
TP
q q=,  
* *
1
TP
p p=   
* *
11 1
TP
q q=   
* *
21 2
TP
q q=, .
Then, the dual-channel supply chain is coordinated by 
the two-part-tariff contract 
* *
* * 
11 ,( )w T
 *
2 3
2
(1 )2 aw w p
b
θ−
= = −
~ ~
~ ~
.
For the case 2 and case 3 -k1<Δcm<k2.
* *
* * 
11 ,( )w T
 *
2 3
2
(1 )2 aw w p
b
θ−
= = −
~ ~
~ ~
, and
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Thus, * * *TP TP 
2 3p p p= =
 
  
 * * *
12 13 1
TP TP
q q q= =
   * * *
22 23 2
TP TP
q q q= =
,
* * *TP TP 
2 3p p p= =
 
  
 * * *
12 13 1
TP TP
q q q= =
   * * *
22 23 2
TP TP
q q q= =
, 
* * *TP TP 
2 3p p p= =
 
  
 * * *
12 13 1
TP TP
q q q= =
   * * *
22 23 2
TP TP
q q q= = .
Then, the dual-channel supply chain is coordinated by 
the two-part-tariff contract * * 22 ,( )w T
 * *
4 2
2
(1 )2 m
aw p c k
b
θ−
= + ∆ − −
~~
~
.
For the case 4 Δcm≥k2,* * 22 ,( )w T
 * *
4 2
2
(1 )2 m
aw p c k
b
θ−
= + ∆ − −
~~
~
, and
~
.
Thus, p p 
**
4
TP
=
  * *
24 2
TP
q q=
 
 
* *
14 1
TP
q q=
,
p p 
**
4
TP
=
  * *
24 2
TP
q q=
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 
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p p 
**
4
TP
=
  * *
24 2
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q q=
 
 
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TP
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.
Then, the dual-channel supply chain is coordinated by 
the two-part-tariff contract * * 
44 ,( )w T
~ ~ .
As is shown above,  the two-part-tariff contract used 
above can  coordinate the decentralized supply chain 
when production cost disruption occurs. 
5.  NUMERICAL EXAMPLES
Let a=2,000 (the market scale of a given product), 
b1=10, b2=20 (the price response factor), θ=0.4 (the 
online market share), cm=20 (the unit production cost), 
cd=4 (the unit online sales cost), cr=6 (the unit offline 
sales cost), k1=k2=5 (the unit cost which deviates 
from the original production plan). Several numerical 
examples are given to illustrate the results derived in 
the paper when different production cost disruption 
happens.
If the manufacturer still uses the original two-part-tariff 
policy under static state when production cost disruption 
happens, as that in the Situation I, then the total profits in 
the decentralized supply chain and those in the centralized 
decision are shown in Table 2. As is shown in Table 2, the 
supply chain can be coordinated under the two-part-tariff 
policy used in this paper when production cost disruption 
occurs. 
Table 2
Parameters Under Decision in the Supply Chain When Production Cost Disruption
Δcm Case
π π
 *p
 *TPp
 *w
 *Q
 dπ
 rπ
 d r+
 Π
~ ~
~ ~
~ ~ ~
~
~
π π
 *p
 *TPp
 *w
 *Q
 dπ
 rπ
 d r+
 Π
~ ~
~ ~
~ ~ ~
~
~
π π
 *p
 *TPp
 *w
 *Q
 dπ
 rπ
 d r+
 Π
~ ~
~ ~
~ ~ ~
~
~
q
~*
1 q
~*
2
π π
 *p
 *TPp
 *w
 *Q
 dπ
 rπ
 d r+
 Π
~ ~
~ ~
~ ~ ~
~
~
π π
 *p
 *TPp
 *w
 *Q
 dπ
 rπ
 d r+
 Π
~ ~
~ ~
~ ~ ~
~
~
π π
 *p
 *TPp
 *w
 *Q
 dπ
 rπ
 d r+
 Π
~ ~
~ ~
~ ~ ~
~
~
π π
 *p
 *TPp
 *w
 *Q
 dπ
 rπ
 d r+
 Π
~ ~
~ ~
~ ~ ~
~
~
π π
 *p
 *TPp
 *w
 *Q
 dπ
 rπ
 d r+
 Π
~ ~
~ ~
~ ~ ~
~
~
0 2 46 46 32 340 280 620 10840 2240 13080 13080
-10 1 43.5 43.5 27 365 330 695 9428 3465 12893 12893
-6 1 45.5 45.5 31 345 290 635 10608 2465 13073 13073
-2 2 46 46 32 339.2 278.8 618 10808 2230 13038 13038
4 3 46 46 32 341.6 282.4 624 10904 2259 13163 13163
8 4 47.5 47.5 35 328.2 254.8 583 11535 1656 13191 13191
12 4 49.5 49.5 39 309.8 217.2 527 12027 977 13004 13004
CONCLUSION
This paper studies a dual-channel supply chain consisting 
of one manufacturer and one traditional retailer in which 
the manufacturer is the leader of the Stackelberg game 
and sets the same retailer price in the online channel 
as that in the offline channel. The manufacturer has its 
own online channel when he sells product to the offline 
retailer. The optimal retail price and the sale quantities are 
shown when the supply chain is in static state. Then some 
unexpected events make production cost change in the 
supply chain. We design a two-part-tariff contract with a 
one-time transfer payment to coordinate the supply chain 
under the production cost disruption. The results are as 
follows: There exist some certain robustness both in the 
manufacturer’s production quantity and in the offline retail 
price when the deviation of production cost is relatively 
small. If the change of production cost is large enough, 
the manufacturer needs to adjust the corresponding retail 
price and production quantity according to the two-part-
tariff contract we design in this paper. Some numerical 
examples are also presented. 
The disruption management in dual-channel supply 
chain is a meaningful and interesting field. There are still 
a lot of questions that need to be studied. For example, 
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how to coordinate the dual-channel supply chain when the 
demand and cost disruption happens simultaneously is a 
very interesting question.
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